The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will hold its 25th Leaders’ Summit in Tianjin, China, from August 31 to September 1, 2025. Beijing confirmed the dates in July, with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi calling the event a symbol of solidarity, friendship, and tangible results under the “Shanghai Spirit.” For Pakistan, this summit arrives at a delicate geopolitical moment, offering a stage where sensitive regional issues could be quietly advanced under a multilateral umbrella.
China has extended a formal invitation to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, marking his first visit to China since 2019. Officials in Islamabad view this as a potential signal of reduced tensions after the 2020 Galwan border clash. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not confirmed Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s attendance, senior officials from the China Desk say the visit is under active review and would align with Pakistan’s multilateral engagement strategy. Parliamentary sources confirm that the National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs has already held closed-door briefings on summit logistics and agenda priorities.
Tianjin’s selection as host is not without meaning. As one of China’s four municipalities under direct central control, it is a major port city connecting industrial northern China to both domestic and global maritime routes. Officials in Pakistan’s Planning Commission see the choice as a nod to China’s connectivity vision, which integrates land and sea trade under the Belt and Road framework. For Islamabad, this symbolism reinforces the centrality of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a flagship in that larger vision, linking maritime routes from Tianjin’s shipping terminals to Gwadar’s deep-sea port.
Beyond the summit’s public agenda, Pakistani officials have prepared three key messages for President Xi Jinping in private discussions. First is the Indus Waters Treaty, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ South Asia Division will ask China to use its influence with India to uphold the 1960 agreement and resolve disputes through established mechanisms. A Planning Commission memorandum warns that upstream hydropower projects threaten Pakistan’s agricultural capacity, making this a pressing matter for food security. Second is the security of CPEC and Chinese nationals in Balochistan, where assessments from the Ministry of Interior and the General Headquarters point to a recent spike in targeted attacks. Islamabad hopes Beijing will discourage any state-linked support to anti-CPEC groups. This follows assurances made during President Asif Ali Zardari’s February visit to Beijing that Pakistan will safeguard all Chinese personnel and projects. Third is Kashmir, where the Ministry’s Kashmir Cell believes that sustained Chinese references to the dispute in regional peace discussions could help reopen even limited channels of contact with India, albeit quietly and without public mediation.
Islamabad’s broader SCO diplomacy is not limited to China. The Multilateral Affairs Division of the Foreign Ministry notes that Russia remains an important factor due to its defense relationships with both Pakistan and India. The Embassy in Tashkent has reported that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan strongly support expanding transport corridors through Pakistan, which the Ministry of Commerce sees as an opportunity to integrate Central Asian trade routes with CPEC. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, dealing with their own water and border issues, are considered likely to sympathize with Pakistan’s security and water management concerns.
Inside the government, the Ministry of Planning describes the SCO as a multiplier for infrastructure diplomacy, while Minister Ahsan Iqbal has stressed that the forum could secure both project financing and new market access in Central Asia. The Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, led by MNA Mohsin Dawar, has urged that Pakistan seek risk guarantees for industries linked to CPEC’s second phase. Foreign Ministry officials say the Prime Minister’s planned delegation includes senior officers from commerce, railways, and energy to ensure any agreements can be acted upon immediately through direct engagement with Chinese state enterprises and SCO economic bodies.
Policy research circles are also weighing in. The Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad believes the summit could enhance Pakistan’s standing in Eurasia at a time when direct dialogue with India is stalled. The Islamabad Policy Research Institute has recommended positioning Pakistan as a bridge for trade and energy between Central Asia and the Arabian Sea. The Sustainable Development Policy Institute has urged the government to use the SCO to attract investment insurance and renewable energy funding alongside traditional security cooperation.
The Ministry’s Strategic Policy Planning Division frames the SCO as part of the architecture of a multipolar world, one that serves as a counterbalance to Western-led alliances and fosters Global South economic cooperation. Within this view, the Ministry of Commerce is exploring how SCO trade facilitation could be paired with new regional payment systems to enable non-dollar settlements.
Afghanistan remains part of the equation. The Ministry of Defence plans to raise coordinated counter-terrorism and border stability measures, while the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions is drafting proposals for refugee management and humanitarian coordination. These, officials say, are essential for stabilizing transit routes critical to CPEC’s western branches.
In preparatory briefings to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, the Foreign Ministry has expressed strong support for China’s initiative to expand SCO working groups into areas like cross-border digital trade, transport standards, and renewable energy. The July SCO Media and Think Tank Summit in Zhengzhou, attended by Pakistani media and policy scholars, reinforced the message that the ability to shape narratives is now as important as shaping policy itself.
Economic stakes remain high. Agreements reached in February between China and Pakistan to upgrade Pakistan Railways’ Main Line-1, advance the Gwadar Port industrial zone, and explore offshore oil and gas ventures are being positioned as examples of SCO–Belt and Road synergy. Yet the Ministry of Interior warns that persistent unrest in Gwadar and wider Balochistan could undermine foreign contractor confidence if not addressed quickly.
Security planning has intensified in the lead-up to Tianjin. Following recent militant incidents, the Prime Minister chaired a high-level review in July directing the Ministry of Interior and provincial governments to establish layered security perimeters around CPEC installations. The National Security Committee, informed by GHQ briefings, has stressed joint intelligence coordination with Chinese security teams as essential.
Officials in the Foreign Ministry say the success of Pakistan’s summit diplomacy will be judged not by images of handshakes but by whether Chinese messaging to India remains consistent on water governance, anti-CPEC security, and Kashmir. Even modest progress, such as expert-level water talks or humanitarian initiatives along the Line of Control, would strengthen the SCO’s reputation as a forum capable of reducing tensions among its members.
The Tianjin Summit presents Pakistan with a rare combination of factors: a China looking to project unity, an India willing to attend, and a multilateral stage wide enough to carry sensitive exchanges. Turning these conditions into concrete results will require disciplined diplomacy, close security coordination, and follow-through with key SCO partners. As one senior Foreign Ministry official noted, the SCO is unlikely to settle South Asia’s disputes in a single meeting, but it can make sure the lines of communication stay open.
