In 2025, Pakistan has sought to reposition itself at the center of regional diplomacy, using trilateral engagement with China and Afghanistan as one of its most important platforms. The dialogue reflects a broader recognition that the old patterns of mistrust and reactive policy are insufficient in today’s fluid environment. Instead, security challenges, economic interdependence, and shifting alignments demand proactive cooperation.
For Pakistan, the benefits of such trilateral diplomacy are threefold. The first is security. Cross-border militancy remains the most acute threat to Pakistan’s internal stability. Groups exploiting ungoverned spaces in Afghanistan have carried out repeated attacks inside Pakistan, undermining public confidence and straining state resources. Structured trilateral engagement provides Islamabad with an avenue to press for commitments from Kabul while also bringing Beijing’s influence to bear. China’s role is not marginal; as a strategic partner of both countries, it has the leverage to encourage Afghan authorities to restrict militant activity and to incentivize cooperation by tying it to investment and development. If these assurances translate into action, Pakistan stands to benefit from a measurable reduction in violence, improved border management, and greater space for economic activity in its conflict-affected regions.
The second benefit is economic. By linking Afghanistan more formally to the Belt and Road Initiative and extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor northward, Islamabad can reimagine its geography as an asset rather than a constraint. A functioning east-west and north-south transit system would connect Pakistani ports to Central Asian markets, open up new energy corridors, and reduce transportation costs for regional trade.
For Pakistan’s own economy—burdened by debt, energy shortages, and uneven growth—this integration could unlock new revenue streams, stimulate employment in underdeveloped provinces, and attract further foreign investment. Moreover, a more stable Afghan economy, supported by Chinese infrastructure and mining ventures, would help reduce the spillover of refugees and criminal networks into Pakistan, creating indirect but significant security dividends.
The third, often overlooked, benefit is diplomatic. By anchoring itself in a cooperative mechanism with both Kabul and Beijing, Islamabad sends a signal to external powers that it is not isolated but rather a facilitator of dialogue in a volatile region. This matters in an environment where Indian assertiveness, Afghan uncertainty, and great-power competition all interact. Through trilateral diplomacy, Pakistan not only strengthens its partnership with China but also carves out space to manage Afghan relations with a degree of predictability. This soft power dimension—being seen as a constructive actor—is itself a strategic gain in an era when reputational capital translates into political leverage.
The potential outcomes of such cooperation extend beyond Pakistan’s immediate borders. A reduction in terrorism, greater cross-border connectivity, and enhanced trust between neighbors could gradually reshape South Asia’s security calculus. While challenges remain—including the credibility of Afghan commitments, the durability of Chinese investment, and the persistence of regional rivalries—the strategic logic is clear. Trilateral cooperation offers Pakistan a chance to move from a defensive posture to a proactive role, securing its frontiers while advancing economic growth.
In the long run, the success of this framework will depend less on declarations and more on sustained implementation. But if momentum is maintained, Pakistan could emerge not only as a beneficiary but as a central architect of a more stable and economically interlinked region.
