The crisis between India and Pakistan in May 2025 has become a defining moment in South Asian geopolitics, not merely for its military dimension but for the diplomatic fallout that followed. India had sought to assert itself as a decisive regional power capable of punishing Pakistan militarily while maintaining global legitimacy through diplomatic finesse. Yet, the aftermath of the conflict told an entirely different story. Far from consolidating its position, New Delhi found itself diplomatically cornered, isolated in global forums, and struggling to justify its actions before an increasingly sceptical international audience. What began as an attempt to project strength and strategic autonomy ended up exposing the deep flaws in India’s external engagement and diplomacy. The May crisis thus revealed not a triumph of Indian statecraft, but the limitations of its diplomacy, including overreliance on rhetoric, underestimation of Pakistan’s resilience, and a misconception of global opinion. For Pakistan, on the other hand, the episode presented an opportunity to demonstrate restraint, garner international recognition, and project itself as a responsible actor seeking stability in a volatile region. In the months that followed, it became clear that the real casualty of the crisis was not Pakistan’s credibility, but India’s diplomacy.
- The author Abdullah Rehman Butt, is working as a Research Fellow at the Maritime Centre of Excellence (MCE), Lahore. He can be reached at abdullahrehmanbutt1122@gmail.com.
- *The views and opinions expressed herein, and any references, are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of the Centre for Development and Stability (CDS).
Even during the crisis itself, international reactions were frustrating for Delhi. The UN chief, for example, issued only a neutral appeal for “maximum military restraint” from both sides, refusing to single out Pakistan for blame. Indian leaders were unhappy that the United States, after privately warning Modi of a “catastrophic” escalation, announced the ceasefire on May 10 without even towing Indian rhetoric. Behind the scenes, Indian officials were caught off guard by U.S. diplomacy; President Trump openly took credit for stopping the war, and even hosted Pakistani leadership, thanking him “for not going into the war”. New Delhi was largely reduced to protesting these manoeuvres rather than shaping them, as global leaders uniformly pushed for calm instead of playing India’s tune.
Key regional actors maintained a calculated distance, opting not to rally behind India during the crisis. Even long-time friends acted as mediators rather than backers. Saudi Arabia, for example, dispatched its foreign minister to both New Delhi and Islamabad on May 8-9, explicitly to urge de-escalation. Pakistan’s military spokesman later confirmed that the Saudi mission “was very positive” in helping secure the ceasefire. In other words, India had to rely on Saudi good offices (rather than its own diplomacy) to end the crisis. Similar dynamics played out elsewhere: China publicly called for peace but, at the same time, reaffirmed an “ironclad friendship” with Pakistan and offered to mediate. Beijing even vetoed India’s attempts at the UN Security Council to sanction so-called Pakistan-linked terror groups, while imposing levies on Indian exports in a pointed rebuke. These actions by Beijing and others left India visibly undermined as its regional partners refused to isolate Islamabad, while Pakistan’s ties to those partners only strengthened.
Global media coverage also underscored India’s isolation. Critics pointed out that despite New Delhi’s spirited outreach, “the diplomatic failure is equally glaring…Most countries called for ‘mutual de-escalation’” rather than endorsing India’s narrative. International media outlets bluntly noted “no major country openly supported India,” whereas “China, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia were seen standing with Pakistan”. The same reports observed that Pakistan’s version of events largely dominated world headlines. India’s much‑vaunted claims, for instance, that it had struck terrorist bases deep inside Pakistan, were “largely dismissed by the global community,” whereas Islamabad’s account was treated as more credible. In short, Delhi’s attempts to reframe the crisis as a fight against terrorism fell flat, and international opinion tended to view the standoff as a bilateral security crisis requiring calm, not as a one-sided counterterror operation.
Meanwhile, Islamabad’s diplomacy was far more effective. Pakistan immediately rallied support from concerned capitals. Its foreign office reported contacts with Russia and other powers, for example, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar spoke by phone with Russia’s Sergey Lavrov, who “stressed the importance of diplomacy…avoiding any escalation”. Pakistan also formally requested the UN Security Council to meet and deliberate on India’s “aggressive actions” along the border. By contrast, India followed its official line of rejecting third-party mediation, making few concessions on global messaging. The result was that friendly countries felt freer to call for restraint on both sides, or even to voice Pakistan’s side, without fear of losing Delhi’s favour.
India’s own post-crisis diplomacy only cemented its troubles. Rather than initiating dialogue, New Delhi imposed punitive measures: it suspended the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, halted bilateral trade, cancelled visas and closed its land border, steps which have severely shrunk the diplomatic space needed for dialogue. Such moves might have satisfied the domestic audience, but internationally, they were seen as vindictive and unhelpful. Simultaneously, India dispatched multiple parliamentary delegations around the world to explain its position on terrorism. But its message fell on sceptical ears, as most global and regional actors were more concerned with nuclear escalation risks than with India’s narrative of militant threats. Even in places like Canada, Pakistan’s allegations (for example, that India sent drones into Sikh holy sites), combined with claimed Kashmiri‑terror concerns, created a backlash against New Delhi’s claims.
The broader implications for India’s foreign policy are significant. Delhi’s recent “multi-alignment” approach, leaning heavily on the US while trying to balance China and traditional allies, was exposed as fragile. Middle Eastern states, in particular, realised that India no longer possesses the diplomatic leverage to easily sway their positions, prompting them to adopt a more cautious and measured approach in dealing with New Delhi. India’s once-rising image as a reliable security provider in Asia now stands tarnished, while its new doctrine of “striking below the nuclear threshold” has failed to earn it either goodwill or strategic flexibility from the international community. Instead, New Delhi may find that allies treat its warnings more cautiously, recalling how Islamabad conducted its defence with outside support this time.
In conclusion, the May 2025 conflict revealed that India’s grand diplomatic claims did not match reality. Key powers and regional players saw through its narrative, refused to simply follow suit, and even advanced Pakistan’s case. By contrast, Pakistan’s firm response and assertive outreach contributed to its larger interests in the region and achieved de-escalation. India now faces a more crowded diplomatic field, where its previous arguments about cross-border terrorism will have to compete with concerns about nuclear risk and international law. For Pakistani strategists, the episode vindicates a more restrained, outreach-oriented approach, while India must grapple with the fact that military boldness may not translate into diplomatic success.
