Pakistan’s Heavy Price in the War on Terror
During the 20-year war on terror, Pakistan stood as a frontline ally of the US-led Western coalition. Yet, it bore the brunt of devastation — losing over 80,000 lives and suffering an economic loss exceeding $150 billion.
- Pakistan’s Heavy Price in the War on Terror
- Short-Lived Optimism After Taliban Takeover
- TTP – The Villain of Peace
- Re-emergence of Indian Influence
- Internal Troubles of the Taliban Regime
- Indo–Afghan–Israel Nexus
- Pakistan’s Decisive Military Response
- Ceasefire Requests and Renewed Aggression
- Pakistan in Control
- Peace Disrupted Again
- Strategic Outlook
- The author Brigadier (Retd.) Asif Haroon Raja, is a retired Brigadier General, war veteran, defence and security analyst, columnist, author of five books, ex-chairman TFP, Patron-in-chief CDS Think Tank, and takes part in TV talk shows.
- *The views and opinions expressed herein, and any references, are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of the Centre for Development and Stability (CDS).
The war was externally manipulated; Afghanistan became the launching pad for massive covert operations led by India’s RAW and supported by the CIA, MI6, BND, Mossad, and the NDS.
Despite these heavy odds and Pakistan’s self-defeating policy of appeasing Washington by “doing more,” the Pakistan Armed Forces successfully defeated terrorism within their borders. By 2015, they had uprooted the entire infrastructure of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its 60 affiliated groups, forcing them to flee into Afghanistan.
Short-Lived Optimism After Taliban Takeover

The US withdrawal and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 under Haibatullah Akhundzada initially raised great hopes in Islamabad. Pakistan expected its western border to once again become peaceful — as it had been during Mullah Omar’s rule (1996–2001).
However, the optimism was short-lived. The western border remained volatile, and security challenges intensified instead of subsiding.
TTP – The Villain of Peace
The TTP became the main spoiler in bilateral relations. It refused to disarm, renounce militancy, or reintegrate peacefully into Pakistani society. Despite Pakistan’s repeated appeals, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) neither restrained the group nor discouraged cross-border terrorism. Kabul’s justification — that the TTP were their “blood brothers” who had fought alongside them — only emboldened the terrorists.
Re-emergence of Indian Influence
Compounding Pakistan’s concerns were the revival of Indian influence in Afghanistan and the reactivation of the NDS. The IEA failed to uphold its Doha Agreement commitments (February 2020), wherein it had pledged not to allow Afghan soil to be used against any other state.
Pakistan remains the sole sufferer of this breach. Despite counsel from Russia, China, Iran, and Arab states**, the Afghan regime has done nothing to restrain Pakistan-specific groups like the TTP and BLA.
Internal Troubles of the Taliban Regime

The IEA (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) today faces grave financial and food crises, compounded by its international isolation. Its inability to control the multitude of militant factions within Afghanistan poses an existential threat.
Factionalism has deepened between the Haqqani group under Sirajuddin Haqqani in the east and the **Panjsher-based faction under Abdullah Masud in the north. Even the Qandhari leadership has shown cracks, while the National Resistance Force (NRF) grows active in Northern Afghanistan.
Sirajuddin Haqqani — once a respected figure — has reportedly been sidelined, his powers curtailed, and his deputies removed.
Meanwhile, the disbanded Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), numbering around 350,000, remain a potential threat to the ultra-conservative Taliban regime, which faces popular discontent due to strict Sharia enforcement and curbs on women’s rights and education.
The Islamic State–Khorasan Province (IS-KP), espousing a Salafist ideology and reportedly backed by the US and Israeli intelligence, poses the most lethal threat to the IEA. IS-KP is linked with 23 militant outfits, including Al-Qaeda, TTP, BLA, Jaish-ul-Adl, IMU, and ETIM.
Ideologically aligned with the TTP, the IEA continues to harbour and patronise anti-Pakistan elements.
Indo–Afghan–Israel Nexus

A disturbing development has been the emergence of an Indo–Afghan–Israel nexus, strategically aligned against Pakistan. The IEA (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan ) has preferred India over its immediate neighbours Pakistan, China, Russia, and Iran, deepening its strategic ties with New Delhi — the chief orchestrator of terrorism in Pakistan.
During the India–Pakistan conflict of May 2025, Israel joined as a strategic partner of India, while Afghanistan played a secondary role by keeping Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan destabilised through proxies.
Following its defeat, India conspired with Afghanistan to ignite the western front, continuing to bleed Pakistan through TTP and BLA terrorism — a clear attempt to create three-directional pressure on Pakistan.
Pakistan’s Decisive Military Response

The Afghan foreign minister’s visit to New Delhi in October 2025 appears to have been the turning point. While Mutaqqi was still in India, Afghan forces launched coordinated cross-border attacks across six points on the night of 10–11 October, citing Pakistan’s surgical strikes on TTP hideouts as a pretext.
The Pakistan Army responded swiftly and decisively. The attacks were repulsed, and the attackers were forced to abandon their posts. Pakistan destroyed and captured 21 Afghan military posts, hoisted its flags, and inflicted over 250 casualties on Afghan troops and TTP militants. Several command centres and base camps were obliterated. Kabul was compelled to seek a ceasefire within hours.
Ceasefire Requests and Renewed Aggression
Pakistan initially rejected four ceasefire requests, finally agreeing to a 48-hour truce on humanitarian grounds to allow the evacuation of Afghan casualties. However, renewed attacks followed on 14–15 October in the Kurram and Spin Boldak sectors.
Once again, Pakistan repelled the aggression, destroying more enemy posts and battalion HQs. Precision missile and drone strikes were conducted in Kabul and Kandahar, targeting the intelligence HQ and TTP command centres, killing key figures including IEA intelligence chief Maulvi Wasiq and TTP chief Noor Wali.
Subsequently, Haibatullah’s training compound for suicide bombers and a joint TTP–BLA camp were destroyed in Kandahar.
Faced with heavy losses, Kabul again sought a ceasefire, which was agreed upon from 15 to 17 October. Talks are now planned in Doha, to be attended by Pakistan’s defence minister, army chief, and DG ISI.
Pakistan in Control

Today, Pakistan’s flags flutter over 29 captured Afghan posts along the Durand Line. The Pakistan Army is well-positioned to create a forward buffer zone, securing its western frontier.
Kabul’s media is downplaying its losses and denying Noor Wali’s death. Yet, the battlefield realities are clear: Pakistan has reasserted its deterrence.
Peace Disrupted Again
Despite the ceasefire, IEA-sponsored Khawarij infiltrators attempted incursions into Mohmand Agency and South and North Waziristan, but were eliminated before causing damage. Pakistan’s retaliatory strikes in Paktia, Khost, and Paktika killed over a hundred militants. Kabul again sought an extension of the ceasefire for peace talks.
Meanwhile, Pakistan continues its targeted operations against militants, accelerates the deportation of Afghan refugees, and maintains tight control of border crossings, keeping only Chaman open for one-way traffic to facilitate refugee return. Afghan cargo remains suspended at Karachi ports.
Strategic Outlook
Pakistan’s vigilance on its eastern front remains steadfast. The armed forces are fully prepared for a two-front confrontation. The Indian propaganda machinery, frustrated by Pakistan’s success, is churning out fake news, alleging that Pakistan has “turned Afghanistan into Gaza.”
Certain PTI trolls are echoing this narrative, urging restraint, while Imran Khan, from prison, has offered to mediate — without explaining what leverage he possesses that others lack.
Pakistan, however, is no longer inclined toward appeasement or self-restraint. It is marching toward becoming a hard state, ready to secure its sovereignty and crush external and internal threats with resolve.
