Cessation of Hostilities

Summary

In October 2025 a sharp escalation on Pakistan’s western border culminated in cross‑border exchanges, precision strikes inside Afghanistan, and intensive diplomacy mediated by Qatar and Türkiye.

This account reconstructs the events, the Doha talks, and the strategic context — and offers an analysis of why the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) departed from the spirit of earlier agreements and why Islamabad elected a harder policy. It ends with recommendations to convert the temporary ceasefire into a durable settlement.

Timeline of the Escalation

Night of 10 October: The confrontation began when Afghan forces opened heavy, unprovoked fire on Pakistani forward posts in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), while a large number of militants (referred to here as Khawarijs) infiltrated to conduct terrorist attacks inside Pakistan.

10–13 October: Pakistan responded with force, destroying multiple enemy military posts and terror camps. Heavy casualties were inflicted on attacking Afghan units and allied militants.

13 October: Kabul requested and a temporary ceasefire was agreed. The truce collapsed on 14 October when Afghan forces again struck Kurram and Spin Boldak sectors.

15–17 October: Pakistan struck back decisively—repulsing attacks, seizing or destroying Afghan posts and terror bases, and conducting missile and drone strikes on Khawarij sanctuaries in Kandahar and Kabul. Islamabad tightened economic and humanitarian measures: all five border crossing points were closed, Afghan Transit Trade was suspended, Afghan cargo was off‑loaded at Karachi, and deportation of illegal residents was accelerated.

17 October: Despite a 48‑hour ceasefire agreed in the evening at Kabul’s request, anti‑Pakistan militants (notably the Gul Bahadur group) attacked in South and North Waziristan, martyring Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan retaliated across the border on the night of 17/18 October, striking bases and eliminating several senior militant leaders.

18 October: Field Marshal Asim Munir, addressing passing‑out cadets at PMA Kakul, warned that any new hostility would be met with devastating response and reiterated that Pakistan was prepared to counter twin threats.

The Doha Talks

On 18 October the first round of mediated talks convened in Doha under Qatari and Turkish auspices. Pakistan’s defence minister Asif Khwaja and Afghanistan’s defence minister Mulla Yaqub led their delegations.

Key points of the Doha agreement

• Political and Strategic Analysis

• Immediate cessation of firing at border crossing points.

• Establishment of a Joint Border Coordination Office linked directly to the militaries of both states.

• Afghanistan’s commitment not to allow its territory to be used for terrorism against Pakistan.

• Humane treatment of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

• Mutual sharing of intelligence on terrorist groups.

• A Peace Corridor for trade at Torkham and Chaman.

• Special medical cards for Afghans requiring treatment in Pakistani hospitals.

• A pledge by both sides to refrain from hostile media propaganda.

• Promotion of friendly narratives grounded in Islamic injunctions.

• Qatar to oversee the agreement; China and Iran to act as guarantors.

• Quarterly review meetings.

• The agreement term: two years, extendable by mutual consent.

• A second meeting was scheduled for 25 October in Istanbul to develop a comprehensive implementation plan.

Why did the IEA breach the 2020 Doha understandings?

The difference in political cohesion, capacity and internal control explains much. The Haibatullah Akhundzada leadership has been weaker and more fractured than the early Mullah Omar era, which had greater centralised control, sharper law‑enforcement and quicker justice mechanisms.

Under Haibatullah the IEA has struggled to control an array of militant groups — roughly two dozen — active in urban centres. The IEA’s ideological proximity to some groups (notably the TTP) combined with a practical fear that such groups might align with IS‑KP or al‑Qaʿida, has led to a de‑facto accommodation where certain militants enjoyed sanctuary and freedom of movement.

The TTP’s strategic objective — return to former FATA status and the imposition of Taliban‑style Shariʿa across Pashtun areas — aligns with ambitions inside sections of the Afghan leadership that envisage shifting the Durand Line and claiming greater Pashtun territory. This convergence incentivised tacit support for cross‑border operations.

India’s role and strategic objectives

New Delhi’s post‑2021 embrace of the IEA was driven by multiple aims: economic projects, military cooperation (including refurbishment and training), and strategic leverage against Pakistan through proxies. India’s strategic calculus reportedly involved attempts to pin down Pakistan’s formations by fomenting instability from Afghan soil — a classic two‑front pressure strategy.

Misperceptions on both sides

Kabul and New Delhi appear to have misjudged Pakistan’s resolve and capabilities. Islamabad’s internal challenges—political, judicial and economic—were assessed as debilitating by some external analysts; Pakistan was judged unable to sustain a two‑front conflict. These assumptions proved gravely mistaken. The intensity and precision of Pakistan’s military response demonstrated the opposite: a force capable of decisive, punitive action.

Islamabad’s policy shift: from appeasement to ‘hard state’ posture

For years Pakistan pursued conciliatory measures toward Afghanistan, hosting millions of refugees and tolerating political sensitivities around the Durand Line. The October escalation marked a deliberate policy shift: Islamabad drew a red line, hit militant sanctuaries beyond its border, and used economic levers (border closures and trade suspensions) to produce political pressure.

This hard posture appears to have produced tangible results: it generated panic within elements of the IEA, precipitated Kabul’s repeated requests for ceasefires, and forced Doha negotiations that include security guarantees and outside guarantors.

Why Afghanistan miscalculated and why the peace may hold — or fail

The Afghan armed forces, and the IEA’s strategic culture, are stronger in irregular, guerrilla‑style conflict within Afghanistan than in conventional cross‑border confrontation. The October clashes exposed these limitations. Kabul likely miscalculated the consequences of escalating proxy warfare against a battle‑hardened Pakistani military.

Whether the Doha agreement lasts depends on several factors:

IEA political cohesion: Can Kabul control or neutralise TTP, BLA and other militant actors?

External patronage and influence: Will India persist in proxy strategies? Will China and Iran — as guarantors — exercise sustained leverage on Kabul? Will Qatar and Türkiye maintain oversight?

Economic incentives: Will Afghanistan prefer trade and development linkages (including potential CPEC connectivity and Central Asian transit options) over continued instability?

Domestic Pakistani politics: Can Islamabad sustain a calibrated mix of pressure and incentives (hard‑line retaliation plus diplomatic engagement and humanitarian measures)?

Pakistan’s Failures of Policy

To be candid, Pakistan bears responsibility for strategic miscalculations that created vulnerabilities:

• An ill‑defined and inconsistent Afghanistan policy that leaned heavily toward appeasement.

• Hosting millions of refugees over decades without a durable strategy for repatriation or economic integration.

• Failure to succinctly communicate and enforce the strategic interdependence between the two countries: Pakistan repeatedly accommodated Kabul without ensuring reciprocal obligations.

• Had Islamabad earlier emphasised the costs of sanctuary to militant groups, and better leveraged economic and diplomatic tools, some of the October escalation might have been averted.

Recommendations

Immediate: Implement and operationalise the Joint Border Coordination Office; resume trade corridors with clear security protocols; continue humanitarian treatment for refugees while accelerating voluntary repatriation and legalisation measures.

Security: Jointly map and dismantle terrorist safe havens with international observers; establish hotlines between field commanders and the coordination office to prevent incidents from spiralling.

Diplomacy: Use the Istanbul meeting to convert the Doha truce into a binding, verifiable security arrangement with China and Iran as guarantors and Qatar/Türkiye as mediators.

Economic: Offer Afghanistan tangible alternatives to dependence on proxy patrons: incremental access to CPEC linkages, Afghanistan‑friendly transit options through Pakistan, and technical assistance for governance and security sector reform.

Narrative and media: Enforce the media‑propaganda commitments; promote joint public messaging on peace rooted in shared Islamic and regional interests.

Border settlement: While sensitive, Islamabad should press for acceptance of the Durand Line as the internationally recognised boundary, alongside arrangements to protect Pashtun cultural and economic rights across the border.

Conclusion

October’s clashes were a watershed that ended an era of one‑sided accommodation and revealed the costs of permissive policy. Pakistan’s decisive response realigned incentives in Kabul and produced a mediated ceasefire and a Doha framework. The test now is whether both sides will translate words into durable, verifiable action — neutralising militant networks, restoring cross‑border commerce, and building institutions that prevent a return to proxy warfare.

If the IEA genuinely prioritises state consolidation, trade and stability over irredentist fantasies, and if external patrons are prepared to hold Kabul to its commitments, the Doha process could mature into a lasting peace. If not, the next round of clashes will likely be deeper and more destructive.

The author Brigadier (Retd.) Asif Haroon Raja, is a retired Brigadier General, war veteran, defence and security analyst, columnist, author of five books, ex-chairman TFP, Patron-in-chief CDS Think Tank, and takes part in TV talk shows.

*The views and opinions expressed herein, and any references, are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of the Centre for Development and Stability (CDS).