Washington is walking a thin line with Beijing over Taiwan
Policymakers in Washington would suggest the American President, that crossing the Taiwan strait for China could be disastrous. It will require more than one million People’s Liberation Army troops, hundreds of ships to transport those troops, and massive air power capabilities. Hence leaders would naturally negate the possibility of an attack keeping in mind the cost associated with it. It is natural for the policymakers to reach this conclusion, because the world view of policymakers and leaders mainly are dictated by rationality. A toolbox which fundamentally operates on what are the benefits and downsides for China going that way, in this case. Hence by this logic, it naturally assumes that policymakers and leaders in Zhongnanhai thinks rationally.
The world has seen whether the invasion of Ukraine was a rational choice on part of Putin? I doubt. Think for instance: French President Emmanuel Macron negated the possibility of any Russian invasion of Ukraine weeks ago the actual invasion happened, and German Intelligence officials were surprised with Russian invasion of Ukraine, because their thinking mainly were driven by the fact that Putin is rational actor. If Rationality is the guiding principle of United States for assuming Xi’s China not to attack Taiwan, then it destined to fail. The US-China relationship is witnessing a paradigm shift. The U.S. House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022, has totally changed the equation. It has provided Beijing an excuse of staging its large scale military exercises.
The US-China relationship is witnessing a paradigm shift. The U.S. House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022, has totally changed the equation. It has provided Beijing an excuse of staging its large scale military exercises.
While it has been seen as an urgent issue by Washington to give Taiwan, confidence in the aftermath of Russian invasion of Ukraine. But it also prompted concerns across the region from allies of both nations. Notably among U.S. allies were Japan and Australia who supported the visit and issued a joint statement on the sidelines of ASEAN summit, showing‘’ their concerns about International peace and stability’’ and urging Beijing to stop its military drills’’ which the latter held in its response to speaker visit.
Similarly, others nations like, Indonesia, suggested both the parties to, ‘’refrain from provocative actions’’ showing its respect for one China policy. Singapore issued a statement, ‘’ hoping that U.S. and China work out a modus vivendi, exercise self-restraint and refrain from actions that will further escalate tensions.’’ Similar statements were issued by Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam, urging all parties to refrain from actions that could escalate tensions in the region.
A notable contrast among all these was South Korea, who issued anodyne statements. Park Jin, South Korean foreign minister said: Intensifying geopolitical tensions in Taiwan strait would hamper political and economic activity in the Taiwan strait and could create,‘’ ripple effects with negative consequences for the Korean peninsula.’’ An interesting development was the quickly released joint statement, by ASEAN members reiterating ASEAN support for One China principle, without even mentioning the word, Taiwan.
Beijing has time and again made clear, that it will not hesitate from using force against the island nation, whether and in case, its strategic interest were threatened. The fundamental question which arises from all this is: will Washington intervene militarily? I doubt. What will be the response of its Asian allies and partners? How come allies and partners be willing to take risk, if the leader is not willing to take risk. Some in Washington now believe that, Washington should made a bargain with China and should protect its allies by resolving other maritime issues in South China Sea and East China Sea. Many opposed this idea, by simply saying that should Washington made a grand bargain, will it reduce Beijing appetite for more? The answer is not clear. With Bidenesque internationalism and looming another Trumpian isolationism, Washington is uncertain whether to throw away or carry its policy of strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan.
Three important questions today are more important to be answered: What factors will convince U.S. allies and partners to aid Taiwan in an event of Chinese attack? The response of regional countries if U.S. do not come to Taiwan defense? How will allies and partners of United States view change in U.S. policy towards Taiwan away from Strategic ambiguity? The allies and partner’s willingness to aid Taiwan in an event of attack will depends on different factors, ranging from but not limited to, the cause of an attack and who is more to blame for this, the importance of Taiwan to allies and partners in comparison to Beijing, potential fear of Chinese retaliation in aiding Taiwan, domestic and foreign policy choices going into a potential military conflict, and ultimately the importance of partner and allies for United States. The cause of an attack from either side will be affecting allies and partner’s calculations, to aid Taiwan or not. A massive Chinese invasion may garner regional support for Taiwan, drawing many countries into the conflict.
Another important thing is the how much allies and partners consider Taiwan to be a strategic asset, whether independent and democratic Taiwan, and how important Taiwan is for regional security and how will it affect their development in the region, economically. Regional countries might not think, their security to be affected significantly due to an attack on Taiwan, except Japan and Australia. Many countries in the region might resort to the conclusion that how Beijing deals with Taiwan and how it conducts its foreign policy are two different things. Located in close proximity to Taiwan is Japan, whose security in an event of Chinese attack might be threatened severely. It will convince Tokyo that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might use Taiwan as a launching pad to increase its activities near the Japanese territories. Similarly, like Japan, Australian strategists might be worried that an attack on Taiwan would give PLA more power projection capabilities into the wider region of Indo-Pacific with geopolitical implications for Australia.
Third important and critical factor is, Beijing potential retaliation towards regional countries in aiding Taiwan. It might resort to diplomatic, military and political means to inflict heavy economic pain on countries choosing sides in this conflict. Allies and Partners might fear, that Beijing might strike its territories.
The most significant factor, which would decide the fate of this attack, would be whether Washington is willing to intervene militarily? If not, how it might convince allies to? If it sides with no military intervention option, allies and partners of United States might question its credibility to its commitments in the region. In the post war scenario, the region might witness the nuclearization of many countries and decline of United States in the Indo-Pacific region. Potential military intervention has the spark to convert this attack on Taiwan into a broader regional and international war, the repercussions of which might not be understood at this stage.
Washington needs to clarify its commitments towards the island nation. Given the importance of US-China and US-Taiwan relationship, deviation by the United States from its policy (Taiwan Relations Act) would undermine its commitments to China on Taiwan issue, and may well lose cooperation of China on many key issues of fundamental importance. The varying response from allies and partner’s hampers U.S. defense planning and revisiting its policy of strategic ambiguity.
