From Doha to Istanbul: Can Dialogue End Decades of Turmoil Between Pakistan and Afghanistan?

The second round of talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan, convening in Istanbul this weekend, marks a pivotal moment in a long-standing, fraught relationship. The first round in Doha (October 18–19, 2025) produced a ceasefire, and now Islamabad is placing its hopes on a concrete, verifiable mechanism to monitor militant activity emanating from Afghan soil.

This is a delicate balancing act, on one hand, Pakistan demands immediate action against groups such as the Tehrik‑e‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP). On the other, Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban government insists on sovereignty and non-interference. The mediation by Qatar and Turkiye adds a third layer of complexity. The question is, will Istanbul move beyond rhetoric into implementation? And if so, what might the future hold?

What the Talks Represent

A recognition of shared risk

Pakistan has long argued that militant groups use Afghan territory as safe haven, launching cross-border assaults. The recent border flare-ups, including closure of key crossings and deadly exchanges, underscore how fragile the peace is.
For Afghanistan, the Taliban leadership now must grapple with a new reality: regional isolation and diplomatic pressure. The Doha agreement shows Kabul is willing to engage, at least superficially.

From ceasefire to structure

Doha delivered the ceasefire. Istanbul is meant to deliver the mechanism to define cross-border terrorism, set benchmarks, and verify actions, share intelligence, and coordinate operations.

Pakistan’s Foreign Office has stated clearly that the focus is on a verifiable and empirical mechanism to ascertain that Afghan authorities take concrete steps.

Third-party buy-in matters

Turkiye and Qatar’s roles matter. Pakistan trusts Turkiye more than Doha-only mediation, citing Ankara’s counterterrorism experience and bilateral ties.

A credible monitoring mechanism arguably needs a neutral third-party component to build trust and implementation discipline.

Key Challenges and Why Istanbul Must Be More Than A Talk Shop

Sovereignty vs Security

Afghanistan’s Taliban government will resist any mechanism that appears to reduce its sovereignty, being told what to do on its territory is a red line. This tension must be managed with sensitivity.

What counts as success?

Pakistan seeks:

• Dissolution of TTP sanctuaries
• Arrest or expulsion of key TTP figures
• Intelligence-sharing, cross-border coordination
• “Real-time” monitoring of militant movements and financing, but verifying such outcomes is complex because what level of transparency is acceptable, how are benchmarks defined, what time-frames apply?

Trust deficit & border legacy

The 2,600 km Pakistan-Afghanistan border is rugged, porous and contested, traditionally hard to control. Afghanistan accuses Pakistan of air-space and border incursions (712 airspace incursions claimed over recent years).
So even if both agree on paper, implementation faces the structural reality of weak governance and difficult terrain.

Domestic politics & regional shadow-boxing

Influences beyond bilateral relations matter: India, Iran, Russia, the US, Gulf States. Pakistan’s concerns about militant sanctuaries cannot be decoupled from wider geopolitics (for example, India’s Pakistan-Afghanistan malicious nexus).

Afghanistan’s internal capacities remain weak: the Taliban government lacks full international recognition, faces economic collapse, and might prioritize regime survival over cross-border commitments.

What a Real Mechanism Could Look Like

Here’s what a credible mechanism emerging from Istanbul might include:

• Joint Pakistan-Afghanistan technical committee, perhaps co-chaired by Turkiye and Qatar, meeting regularly.
• Shared intelligence centre where Pakistan submits coordinates of suspected militant safe houses and Afghanistan commits to investigation and action.
• Verification teams of independent observers verify if safe houses are destroyed, militants apprehended, and financing traced.
• Border-control reinforcement through joint patrols, biometric tracking at key crossings, and drone or surveillance integration.
• Trade linkage where Pakistan connects the resumption of transit trade (currently suspended) with tangible security improvements.
• Transparent timelines and benchmarks, such as film of safe-house destruction within a set period and monthly reporting to a joint secretariat.
• Dispute resolution mechanism where disagreements are addressed through a mediation panel involving Turkiye and Qatar.

Looking Ahead: Scenarios for the Future

• Optimistic Scenario

Istanbul yields a solid operational framework. Border crossings reopen, trade resumes, and militant attacks decrease substantially. Trust builds gradually, paving the way for deeper Pakistan-Afghanistan cooperation (economic connectivity, infrastructure, refugee issues). Regional actors endorse this as a means of stabilizing the volatile western frontier of South Asia.

• Moderate Scenario

A mechanism is agreed upon but only partially implemented. Occasional militant attacks continue, and border closures still happen temporarily. Trade remains limited. Both sides maintain the ceasefire, but progress is incremental. Still an improvement over open clashes, but far from full peace.

• Pessimistic Scenario

Talks collapse in implementation. Militant incidents spike again. Pakistan resumes unilateral strikes, Afghanistan retaliates. The trust deficit deepens. Border remains closed, trade suffers, and regional instability increases. The ceasefire becomes another pause before the next flare-up.

Why Pakistan Cannot Wait

For Pakistan, the stakes are high; as persistent cross-border militancy drains military resources, hinders economic development in the west, and constrains foreign investment. A protracted frontier conflict also deepens domestic radicalization and undermines civilian governance.

For Afghanistan, stabilizing relations with Pakistan is crucial for economic survival; without border trade, the landlocked country suffers. International legitimacy and foreign aid flows also depend on some degree of regional cooperation.

A peaceful and secure Pakistan-Afghanistan border strengthens regional connectivity, Pakistan’s economic corridor ambitions, and Turkiye’s rising role as a mediator in South Asia.

Conclusion

The Istanbul round offers Pakistan and Afghanistan a rare chance to move from episodic ceasefires and border skirmishes into a structured, verifiable framework of peace and cooperation. But what separates talk from transformation is implementation and accountability.

If Pakistan walks away with just a signature and no means of verification, the cycle of violence will likely resume. If Afghanistan resists a mechanism that it sees as compromising sovereignty, then any agreement will be fragile.

Concisely, Istanbul must deliver measurable benchmarks, clear timelines, transparent verification, and a link between security and trade. Only then will this round not just pause confrontation, but begin to institutionalize peace. Without those ingredients, the ceasefire remains a fragile truce, easily broken.

The author Anum Malik, is affiliated with the State News Agency and contributes her research to the think tank, CDS.

*The views and opinions expressed herein, and any references, are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of the Centre for Development and Stability (CDS).