India’s journey as a nuclear power has always been unique, operating largely outside the global non-proliferation framework. After its first nuclear test in 1974, India faced international sanctions and was a primary reason for the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). However, in 2008, a controversial, country-specific waiver from the NSG granted India access to international nuclear trade without it having to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This special treatment, intended to bring India into the mainstream, has inadvertently created a dangerous reality: a vast nuclear program where many civilian facilities remain outside mandatory International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This structural weakness (gap), arising from its historical path, has created a high-risk situation for nuclear security. The consequences are now alarmingly clear, manifesting in a series of thefts that suggest the presence of an active nuclear black market.
Over the past two decades, India has witnessed a concerning number of documented cases where uranium and other highly radioactive materials were stolen or went missing. For instance, in 2021 alone, 6.4 kg of uranium was seized in Jharkhand, and 7 kg of natural uranium was confiscated in Maharashtra. Perhaps most shockingly, authorities in Kolkata seized a staggering 250 kg of what was believed to be Californium, a substance far more radioactive than uranium. More recently, the seizure of 50 grams of highly radioactive material in Bihar on August 10, 2024, estimated to be worth $100 million, highlights the scale of the problem. These are not minor lapses; the quantities stolen are sufficient to build multiple radiological “dirty bombs.” As security analysts have noted, these recurring events are not just random crimes but indicators of a systemic failure that calls into question New Delhi’s control over its nuclear materials.
Furthermore, this problem is rooted in a lack of international oversight and a flawed domestic regulatory structure that has failed to secure its nuclear material.As security analysts have pointed out, these recurring incidents suggest an active nuclear black market and “call into question the measures taken by New Delhi for the safety and security of nuclear material.” Another key weakness lies in India’s unique and privileged position in the nuclear world. As a non-signatory to the NPT, a large part of its vast nuclear program remains outside the scope of international oversight. With many of its civilian nuclear facilities still not under the mandatory IAEA safeguards, a significant portion of its nuclear material remains in a gray zone, to hide it from the international community’s checks.
Internally, the system is flawed by design. India’s top regulatory body, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), is not truly independent. It operates under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), the very government body it is supposed to regulate. This creates a clear conflict of interest, where the developer of nuclear energy is also its watchdog. This institutional weakness is reflected in the high number of safety-related incidents. According to a report, between 2004 and 2023, about 650 nuclear safety incidents were reported, a number that reveals a risk-prone environment where small failures could easily escalate into a catastrophe.
On the other hand, the threat is magnified by pure geography. Several of India’s key nuclear facilities, such as the Kaiga Power Station, are located in remote areas that are also hotbeds for insurgents, including Naxalite militants. These groups have a long history of violent conflict with the state. The proximity of highly sensitive nuclear materials to organized and violent non-state actors drastically increases the risk of a targeted attack or theft, bringing the terrifying possibility of a “dirty bomb” falling into terrorist hands much closer to reality.
Defenders of India’s nuclear capabilitiesoften point to its centralized Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) as proof of its robust control. However, a top-down command structure is meaningless if the system is being compromised at the ground level. The facts speak for themselves. As one Indian security writer openly says, “The Indian nuclear safety and security system has been penetrated… three times in four years is a clear indication of serious issues. A security chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and India’s has been repeatedly weakened.
This is not a regional problem that the world can afford to ignore; it is a global crisis in the making. Nuclear material does not recognize national borders. A security breach in India could empower a terrorist organization on another continent. A single dirty bomb detonated in a major global city like London, Tokyo, or New York would not only cause immense loss of life but also create widespread panic, cripple economies, and render parts of a city uninhabitable for decades. India’s problem is, without a doubt, everyone’s problem.
The era of polite diplomatic silence has passed. The world needs to act with speed. The IAEA should be granted the authority to conduct comprehensive, mandatory inspections of all of India’s civilian nuclear facilities, not just a select few. The NSG must instantly revoke its special waiver until India can demonstrably match international security standards. In addition, financial monitoring bodies, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ought to aggressively examine any money trails associated with such illicit nuclear trafficking.
In the final analysis, India should be treated just like any other nuclear state. It needs to be moved to sign on to the NPT and to entirely reform its internal regulatory bodies to guarantee real, independent oversight. The present model, opaque and repeatedly compromised, is no longer sustainable. The world simply cannot afford to wait for the next dirty bomb to go out. The pattern is evident, the dangers are increasing, and now is the time for accountability.
