When Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif embraced Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh last week, it was more than diplomacy; it was a signal. The Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA), signed on 17 September, stipulates that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.” To many in India, that felt like a direct threat.
- What’s New — And What Isn’t
- What India Fears — And What It Should Not
- A More Assertive Indian Strategy: Adapt, Not Panic
- Conclusion
- The author Anum Malik, is affiliated with the State News Agency and contributes her research to the think tank, CDS.
- *The views and opinions expressed herein, and any references, are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of the Centre for Development and Stability (CDS).
Yet beneath the high drama, the deal is also an institutionalization of deep, long-standing ties between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s military training, deployment of Pakistani officers, arms procurement, and ideological cooperation ongoing for decades. What changes now is the formalization and symbolic reinforcement of those ties, plus the implicit expansion of deterrence equations beyond South Asia.
India was caught somewhat off guard; diplomatic protocols were nominally respected, but the depth and tone of the pledge (aggression clause, mention of non-conventional forces) pushed into new strategic terrain.
What’s New — And What Isn’t
To evaluate how threatening this pact is to India, we must parse what it does and does not yet provide:
What is New?
- A stronger deterrence posture
By binding Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in a formal joint defense framework, Riyadh is signaling it sees its security as indivisible and is willing to deter external threats more assertively.
The agreement reportedly contemplates not just conventional cooperation but military means; intelligence sharing, defense industry collaboration, capacity-building, and perhaps nuclear or strategic dimensions.
Notably, Pakistani officials have publicly asserted that their nuclear arsenal can be made available to Saudi Arabia under the pact. That is the boldest signal yet in this direction. - A shift in Saudi threat perception
The pact is also a belated acknowledgment that Riyadh can no longer rely on the U.S. as its sole guarantor. Israel’s attacks on Qatar and Western ambivalence have underscored to the Gulf States that they must rethink their security dependencies. In effect, Saudi Arabia is diversifying its defense alliances eastwards (towards Pakistan, perhaps others) to bolster deterrence horizontally. - A more complex regional balance
This pact helps embed Pakistan more tightly into Gulf security architectures, blurring the lines between South Asia and the Middle East. Saudi Arabia may not dramatically alter its ties with India, but the optics and potential leverage change. It also opens the possibility (if only rhetorically for now) of a kind of Islamic security bloc, an idea that alarms some in Delhi.
What is Not Established Yet?
- Operational clarity: The text of the SMDA has not been publicly disclosed. Therefore, how aggression or defense would be triggered, who leads, and under what conditions remains ambiguous.
- Automatic nuclear umbrella: While Pakistani officials have made bold-sounding public statements, no verifiable arrangement is confirmed. Many experts warn that the ambiguity is probably deliberate, and deterrence sometimes works better when adversaries can’t be sure.
- Unilateral focus on India: The pact is regionally oriented. Its intended deterrence is as much aimed at Iran, Israel, even non-state actors (e.g. Houthis), as it is at India.
- Immediate military action: There is no indication that Saudi forces will imminently intervene on Pakistan’s behalf in a war against India. The strategic and logistical costs would be huge, especially given the distance and geometry. Analysts consider that scenario unlikely.
Thus, the Pakistan–Saudi Arabia Defence Pact changes the way the region looks strategically, but for now, it does not actually shift the balance of power in South Asia.
What India Fears — And What It Should Not
India’s unease is understandable. But not all the fears are equally credible. Let me break down the plausible and the exaggerated:
Plausible Risks for India
- Strategic encirclement and perception pressure
This deal contributes to the narrative that Pakistan is not alone and that external actors are willing to underwrite its strategic posture. That perception matters in diplomacy, deterrence, and even global narratives (UN, strategic forums). It also puts India in a tougher position diplomatically in the Middle East: if Saudi Arabia is seen as aligned with Pakistan, Delhi may face additional resistance in Gulf forums. - Diplomatic leverage
With Saudi backing, Pakistan may gain more political clout in regional forums where Gulf support matters (e.g. OIC, Arab League). That shift can hurt India’s interests if it cannot counterbalance. - Intelligence, surveillance, and technology spillovers
Greater defense industry collaboration or intelligence sharing between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia may allow Pakistan access to technologies, logistical support, or bases (e.g. in the Gulf or Arabian Sea region) that could indirectly expand its operational reach. - Psychological pressure and escalation risks
Even if the pact is not directly enforceable, its symbolic weight can produce a more emboldened Pakistan, which might push riskier military options, believing it has external backing.
Overstated Fears
- Saudi military intervening in South Asia
That is almost inconceivable logistically, politically, and operationally. Saudi forces are structured for Gulf defence; they are not an expeditionary army meant to project power into South Asia.
New Delhi’s concern should rather lie in deterrence signaling than actual Saudi boots in Punjab. - Immediate nuclear crisis
Yes, the possibility of a Pakistani nuclear umbrella to Riyadh is being floated. But there is no confirmation, and it would be a dramatic leap. For now, it is a deterrent posture, not a binding operational guarantee.
Experts warn that strategic ambiguity is more likely than binding clarity. - End of India-Saudi relations
The economic stakes are high: Saudi Arabia is a major energy supplier, and India is a large market. It is unlikely Riyadh wants to jeopardize that. Many analysts believe Saudi Arabia will try to balance both sides. Also, India has been deepening defense and strategic links with the Gulf States in recent years.
A More Assertive Indian Strategy: Adapt, Not Panic
India must recalibrate. The opportunity now is not to overreact, but to be nimble, strategic, and proactive.
- Clarify and publicize red lines
India should articulate, publicly and diplomatically, how it interprets key terms like aggression and security cooperation, and under what conditions it would respond. By reducing ambiguity, India can better deter miscalculations. - Deepen defense-West Asia ties
Strengthening defense cooperation with Gulf and Middle Eastern states (e.g., UAE, Qatar, Oman, Egypt) can counterbalance any attempt to make the Saudi-Pakistan axis exclusive. Show that India is a valuable security partner, not just a trade partner. - Intelligence and surveillance focus
India must monitor closely any shifts in Pakistani deployments, Saudi capabilities transfer, basing rights in the Gulf, and new logistic nodes. Early detection matters more than hastily reacting to every signal. - Enhance force posture and deterrence
India should double down on credible deterrence, credible strike options, modernized forces, and survivable capabilities. If Pakistan believes India can respond decisively, external backing will matter less. - Diplomatic balancing act with Riyadh
Maintain high-level engagement with Saudi Arabia, reminding Riyadh of India’s strategic importance: energy, trade, diaspora, and regional balance. Encourage Saudi Arabia to treat India’s sensitivities seriously in bilateral cooperation. India cannot afford to be shoved aside. - Leverage multilateral forums
Engage in forums such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab League, OIC, and UN bodies to shape narratives. Emphasize that stability in South Asia matters to the Middle East too, e.g. via sea lanes, global trade, and security cooperation.
Conclusion
The Saudi-Pakistan pact is a bold recalibration, but it is not necessarily fatal to India’s strategic position. What matters most now is how India adjusts, signals strength, and sustains partnerships.
India enters a new phase where no longer just managing threats from its immediate neighborhood, but also contending with broader defense architectures that span South Asia and the Middle East. The true test will be whether India can adapt faster than its rivals.
