India’s Warmongering

India — The Villain of Peace

Peace in South Asia has been repeatedly undermined by India’s belligerence and expansionist mindset. The core of the Indo-Pakistan rivalry remains Kashmir — the unfinished agenda of the 1947 Partition left by the departing British. That single dispute has produced three major wars, numerous clashes and standoffs, and the recent violent confrontation in May 2025.

Despite some 18 UN resolutions affirming the Kashmiri’s right to self-determination, the cause has been unresolved. Responsibility rests with Indian intransigence, the UN’s ineffectiveness, the self-interest of major powers, and international indifference to the suffering of Kashmiris who live under severe repression.

Victims are routinely labeled “terrorists” while perpetrators are excused. This approach has nuclearized South Asia, created a constant nuclear flashpoint, and held back development across the subcontinent.

The BJP’s Authoritarian Turn

Since Narendra Modi’s BJP assumed power in June 2014, hostility toward Muslims has intensified. Influenced by RSS and hardline Hindutva ideology, the BJP has pursued policies and actions that have aggravated regional tensions and sought to undermine Pakistan by covert and overt means, including propaganda and hybrid warfare. Atrocities against Kashmiris demanding their political rights have skyrocketed.

India increasingly employs subversion, proxy tactics, disinformation and false-flag operations to meet political objectives. Diplomatic overtures from Pakistan have been rebuffed unless Pakistan accepts unacceptable preconditions — demands resembling capitulation: to halt alleged cross-border support for militants, accept the Line of Control as an international border, cede Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, relinquish key aspects of its nuclear program, and submit to Indian dominance. Pakistan has consistently rejected such terms and insists on relations between equals.

India’s economic and military growth — a multi-trillion-dollar economy, a large defence budget, extensive conventional forces and support from powerful states — has bred a dangerous confidence among its civil and military leadership. That confidence, and a humiliating domestic political calculus, contributed to the Indian decision to attack Pakistan in May.

Escalation and the Road to War

Following a controversial incident in Pahalgam on 22 April in Indian-administered Kashmir, India blamed Pakistan and vowed retaliation. Pakistan repeatedly offered joint or independent inquiries; India refused and instead escalated rhetoric and preparations for military action.

India’s narrative cast itself as the victim; in reality, many analysts point to India as a major exporter of destabilizing activity in the region. Indian leaders increasingly threatened cross-border strikes on alleged sanctuaries inside Pakistan — rhetoric that raised the tempo toward direct conflict.

Divisions Within the Indian Military

Not all Indian senior officers welcomed a major military confrontation. In the days before open hostilities, some senior service commanders warned of operational and technical unpreparedness. Commander Northern Command and Technical Intelligence Division Commander were removed for expressing reservations. Concerns about Pakistan’s strengthened army , naval and air capabilities were also voiced by the chiefs of army, navy and air force.

Nevertheless, political leadership pressed forward, apparently confident that outside powers — including reported assurances from the U.S. administration — would manage the nuclear dimension. Among the leading hawks of Modi who created the war hysteria and opted for war were the Indian media, Amit Singh, Rajnath Singh, Ajit Doval and Jaishankar.

Operation Sindhoor and Pakistan’s Response

On the night of 6–7 May, the IAF launched strikes into Pakistani territory, striking civilian targets in six cities and causing more than forty fatalities and injuries. Pakistan, having anticipated Indian moves, responded in self-defence.

According to accounts from Pakistani sources and confirmed by external sources, India’s communications and strategic systems were disrupted by cyber operations early in the conflict. Pakistan achieved air superiority quickly, as a result of the downing of multiple Indian aircraft including four Rafael jets, while sustaining no aircraft losses of its own.  Rapid, coordinated air response of Pakistani forces kept the IAF largely grounded for several days.

The first round was decisively won by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), which stunned India and the world. The milestone was achieved because of personal supervision of PAF chief Air Chief Marshal Sidhu, and transfer of all the air defence assets to PAF for the air war.

In the second round, India employed Israelis-supplied two types of armed drones on May 8 in eleven major cities of Pakistan in swarms to create panic. The 84 intruding drones couldn’t cause any damage and were shit down like partridges. Civilians participated in the shooting spree and enjoyed it as a sport. It was another fiasco.

In the third round on the night of 9/10 May, India launched surface-to-surface Brahmo missiles to destroy Pakistan’s airbases. These strikes caused limited effect, in some cases falling short of intended targets. Half of the missiles missed the intended targets and most landed in Indian East Punjab with one in Afghanistan. It was another disaster for India.

As hostilities continued, Pakistan was forced to set aside its policy of restraint and moved from a primarily defensive posture to a decisive counter-offensive on the early morning of May 10.

Operation Bunyan Al Marsus

Under the command of Gen. Asim Munir, Pakistan’s combined forces—army, air force and navy—launched a coordinated ground, missile and air campaign. Pakistani strikes on a number of Indian military installations and air bases, caused extensive destruction or damage of Indian defence systems, and the disruption of command-and-control nodes associated with cross-border operations.

Tanks, Fatah-1 and Fatah-2 rockets along with missiles and Chinese supplied artillery batteries and close support artillery were used in support of ground forces, while JF-10C and JF-17s gave air cover and struck deeper targets.

Pakistani forces after destroying the forward posts in selected sectors and rupturing the defence line, went 16 km deep across the Line of Control and captured tactical objectives. The Indian soldiers were in disarray and lost their ability to defend and at several places waved white flags.

The attackers destroyed India’s two S-400 batteries deployed at Udhampur and Bhuj,  Brahmos missile storage in Beas corridor, two Brigade HQs (10 and 80 Brigades), a battalion HQ in Leepa at Peersar, artillery gun position and supply depot in Uri, a terrorist camp in Rajauri, a command & control Intelligence HQ in Nauseri supervising cross border terrorism in Pakistan. The command & control system at Baroda was also destroyed.

In sum total, 26 military targets were struck in IOK and across the border. 14 Indian air bases were destroyed or severely damaged. These included Udhampur, Adampur, Akhnur, Pathankot, Poonch, Barnala, Rajauri, Poonch, Ambala , Halwara, Suratgarh, Sirsa, Mamun, Suratgarh. Pakistan’s drones had reached up to Delhi and Gujarat and panicked the Indian public.

The Pakistan Navy’s posture reportedly forced the Indian carrier INS Vikrant to withdraw from the immediate theatre, illustrating Pakistan’s maritime deterrent.

The period from 7 to 10 May was a horrible nightmare for India. In three days, Pakistani forces had broken the myths of invincibility of French Rafaels Russian S400, and Israeli drones. They had achieved superiority of strategic orientation and could easily move forward into IOK.

Pakistan attributes its success to tight joint command, modernized early-warning and air-defence capabilities, electronic warfare, and high morale across the armed forces. The complete synergy between the Pak Army, PAF and Pak Navy , and the will to fight and die displayed by all ranks of the Pakistan armed forces achieved the miracle and rolled the pride and arrogance of shining India.

Ceasefire and Aftermath

When Pakistan achieved operational advantages, India sought external mediation from Washington, London and three Arab States. The U.S. President Donald Trump stepped in and helped broker a ceasefire on the evening of 10 May, averting further escalation and the spectre of nuclear exchange.

Pakistan’s leaders hailed the outcome as a vindication of their defensive posture and military preparedness. The conflict boosted the country’s international standing and accelerated defence partnerships, notably with Saudi Arabia, which later entered into a strategic defence pact with Pakistan.

Propaganda, Accountability and Domestic Fallout in India

In India, military and political leaders sought to shape the narrative of the conflict. Claims about enemy losses were amplified and revised in public statements, leading to confusion and criticism at home.

Bragadocio and false claims made by the chiefs of the Indian Army and the Air Force have made them a laughing stock. Unlike Pakistan, which has displayed the footage of wreckage of destroyed Indian jets, S-400, air bases and HQs, and even shown the tail numbers of the seven jets, India has been unable to furnish a shred of evidence.

The BJP government, already criticized for anti-minority policies, faced domestic political pressure and a potentially volatile electoral environment in the aftermath of the fight.

Pakistan’s Strategic Gains

From Islamabad’s perspective, the conflict affirmed Pakistan’s deterrent credibility. Pakistan has achieved parity in nuclear and missile capabilities and has made substantial improvements in conventional forces, electronic warfare and indigenous defence production. Pakistan has also consolidated an Army Rocket Strategic Force to centralize missile assets and enhance operational command.

Diplomatically, Pakistan has strengthened ties with China, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Azerbaijan, and it reports renewed interest from other regional powers.

The revitalization of strategic economic initiatives, including Phase-2 of CPEC, and the Saudi strategic pact are presented as factors that improve Pakistan’s economic and security outlook, and can help Pakistan in becoming an economically self-reliant state in the future.

Pakistan is viewed as a net peacemaker and a stabiliser in the region, while India is seen as a villain of peace.

If Pakistan’s diplomatic role contributes to a ceasefire or reduction of bloodshed in Gaza or elsewhere, that will further enhance its international reputation as a regional stabilizer.

A Cautionary Note: India Remains Unpredictable

Despite the respite, Pakistan cannot afford complacency. New provocations — false-flag incidents, renewed drone or missile attacks, surgical strikes, proxy operations, or prolonged standoffs — remain possible.

Islamabad must retain full preparedness across defence, diplomacy and cybersecurity to deter or defeat any future aggression.

Conclusion

South Asia’s security depends on honest diplomacy, respect for international law and meaningful efforts to resolve core disputes — above all, the Kashmir question.

Until India abandons maximalist demands and accepts dialogue on equal terms, the risk of recurring conflict will persist. Pakistan’s recent military and diplomatic efforts, its partnerships, and its strengthened defences are responses to that reality, designed to preserve sovereignty and deter aggression in a volatile neighbourhood.

The writer is a retired Brig, war veteran, defence and security analyst, columnist author of five books, ex-chairman TFP, Patron-in-chief CDS Think Tank, Director Meesakh Research Centre, Chief Election Commissioner Tehreek-e-Jawanan. He takes part in TV talk shows regularly.

The author Brigadier (Retd.) Asif Haroon Raja, is a retired Brigadier General, war veteran, defence and security analyst, columnist, author of five books, ex-chairman TFP, Patron-in-chief CDS Think Tank, and takes part in TV talk shows.

*The views and opinions expressed herein, and any references, are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of the Centre for Development and Stability (CDS).