India’s recent call to place Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal under International Atomic Energy (IAEA) oversight has sparked significant diplomatic debate. Though India aspires to present itself as a responsible actor in South Asia, its actions often come across as hypocritical. Rather than acting as a stable actor, India’s Defense Minister Rajnath Singh’s statement seemed more like a political tactic than a genuine concern. Using nuclear rhetoric as a political pretext could undermine the stability and trust between the South Asian countries.
However, credible minimum deterrence is at the core of Pakistan’s nuclear policy. Its counter-threat position is aimed at preventing aggression, not provoking conflicts. Since 1998, Pakistan has significantly expanded to ensure the safety, security, and transparency of its nuclear arsenal.
Pakistan’s nuclear strategy and operational protocols are centrally managed by the National Command Authority (NCA), backed by the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) as its secretariat Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is protected with an extensive nuclear security architecture. Ranging from biometric access control deployment of 10,000 troops and CCTV surveillance to disassembled warheads and immediate response capabilities.
Pakistan marked a significant improvement in the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) nuclear security index 2020, particularly in the “Theft: Secure Materials category. Among the 22 weapon-usable nuclear material countries, India scored 40 out of 100 and ranked 20th out of 22 in the secure material category, below Pakistan.
Such statements are not mere claims. Over time, Pakistan’s positive progress has been acknowledged by international experts, including those from the U.S. Since 9/11, it is reported that the U.S invested over $100 million to help Pakistan in strengthening and securing its nuclear arsenal.
Experts like Ashley Tellis and Yukiya Amano (the former IAEA Director) highlighted Pakistan’s nuclear security as one of the highest among non-NPT signatory countries. At present, the Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security in Pakistan is used to provide a regional training facility, assisting field officers and scientists to fight against nuclear smuggling and sensitive materials.
According to the prominent Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, technically, the validity of India’s claims is baseless. He asserted, even during the most threatening period of terrorism (2006-2012) in Pakistan, that nuclear capabilities remain protected. He stated, it is “physically and technically” impractical for terrorists to get hold of nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is protected by a multilayer security system, often overlooked by those with political agendas.
Whereas, India’s nuclear safety record remains largely unaddressed. While the country claims to be a responsible nuclear power internationally, empirical evidence contradicts these statements. Indian authorities arrested a gang in 2024 and recovered a highly radioactive material, “Californium” worth over $100 million, from their possession. This was just one example of many. In Maharashtra, Indian police seized 6.4kg of natural Uranium. Later on, in Kolkata, 250 kg of Uranium compound was confiscated from a criminal gang. Similarly, in 2021, security officials seized 1kg of Uranium, worth $440,000, from smugglers. Additionally, two similar seizures of 9kg were made in Thane in 2016, and 5kg in Mumbai in 2009.
According to official reports, there have been over 18 cases of uranium theft in India from 1994 to 2021. These cases reveal weak regulatory oversight and regulation of the active trafficking of radioactive materials on the black market. Such breaches pose a significant threat to regional and global security. As required by the IAEA’s resolution 1540, India has repeatedly failed to report this trafficking database about various cases of nuclear material theft.
What further weakens India’s credibility is the lack of independent oversight in its nuclear governance structure. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)—India’s primary regulatory authority—is not autonomous. It functions under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE); the very organization it is meant to regulate. This conflict of interest casts serious doubt on the AERB’s ability to enforce safety standards or halt unsafe operations. Unlike Pakistan, which has developed autonomous regulatory bodies and adopted international best practices, India continues to operate under an opaque and centralized system that lacks independent scrutiny.
Yet, India dares to demand the IAEA oversight of Pakistan’s nuclear program, despite its repeated failures. India and Pakistan are non-NPT signatories, both maintain their atomic programs within the restricted IAEA oversight. However, India’s call for monitoring Pakistan’s program reflects clear hypocrisy. However, the international community is no longer blind to these invalidations. India’s misfiring, BrahMos missile launch in Pakistan in 2022, and reported thefts of nuclear materials have undermined India’s image as a credible atomic state.
Meanwhile, Pakistan is advancing in the field of nuclear science for peaceful purposes. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) operates 19 cancer hospitals that manage over a million operations. Supporting public health as a part of the IAEA’s “Ray of Hope” program.
In agriculture, Pakistan produced over 100 disease-resistant, high-yielding crops with nuclear technology to ensure food for millions in the country. Such developments counter the common belief that nuclear technology serves only a destructive purpose. Thus, Pakistan’s nuclear program plays a vital role in progressing toward the Sustainable Development Goals.
Pakistan has proved a consistent adherence to international coordination. Pakistan has also updated the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and introduced PAK/925 legislation to ensure that nuclear safety culture through its material security framework. The training offered by the Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Science (PIEAS) and the National Institute of Safety and Security (NISAS) for the scientists of the next generation operates according to IAEA standards.
Therefore, the international community must promote evidence-based dialogues instead of fear-based narratives. Maintaining nuclear security and regional stability in South Asia cannot be achieved through a blame game. It needs transparency, accountability, and mutual respect for the sovereignty of another state and international norms. For India, truly concerned about nuclear security, it has to start with its security framework.
