The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s summit in Tianjin was a reminder that global politics is being reordered around interests, not emotions. China and Russia used the platform to advance their multipolar vision, India demonstrated agility by engaging rivals and partners in the same room, and Pakistan once again faced the test of whether it can turn multilateral openings into tangible outcomes. The stage was set not for rhetoric, but for choices that will shape Eurasia’s balance of power in the coming decade.
China’s Global Governance Initiative was the centerpiece, offering not just lofty principles but concrete tools: grants, concessional credit, expanded scholarships, vocational training workshops, and new regional security centers. The Tianjin Declaration reinforced sovereignty, multipolarity, and non-interference, while rejecting bloc politics and unilateral coercion. The symbolism was thick—marking 80 years since the end of World War II and the founding of the United Nations—but so too was the substance. Twenty-four outcome documents and new institutions underscored that the SCO is no longer content to be dismissed as a talk shop. It is evolving into a platform with financial, educational, and security levers that can shape the regional order.
For Pakistan, the summit presented a set of opportunities that are both immediate and long-term. Beijing’s RMB 2 billion in grants this year and RMB 10 billion in credit lines over three years are real avenues for development if Islamabad can prepare shovel-ready projects. Officials have signaled interest in packaging initiatives in water management, agriculture, and health to qualify. The idea of rebranding CPEC’s Special Economic Zones as SCO pilot projects is also being floated, which could broaden their appeal beyond China and attract investment from Russia, Central Asia, and Iran. But these opportunities will slip away if they are approached with the same habit of announcing projects without preparation that has plagued Pakistan’s past.
The education and skills component is equally critical. With millions of out-of-school children and industries facing chronic workforce shortages, the doubling of SCO scholarships, the creation of a PhD track in advanced technologies, and the rollout of Luban vocational workshops offer a chance to reset Pakistan’s human capital trajectory. Yet competition will be fierce. Central Asian states are already moving to secure these slots. If Pakistan delays, it risks being outpaced by peers who are better prepared to capture the benefits.
Security cooperation, too, carries both symbolic and practical weight. By tying trade corridors to SCO’s new security centers, Islamabad can lower the risk premiums that inflate costs for exporters and investors. The linkage between security and commerce has long been underappreciated in Pakistan’s policymaking; Tianjin underscored that one cannot be separated from the other. The SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure provides joint exercises and intelligence sharing that can complement Pakistan’s existing security architecture and strengthen its claim as a responsible stakeholder in Eurasian stability.
But Tianjin also exposed vulnerabilities. The optics mattered. Narendra Modi’s images with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin highlighted India’s ability to play multiple sides, while Pakistan appeared peripheral. Even the possibility of a symbolic handshake between Modi and Shehbaz Sharif—something that could have subtly reshaped atmospherics—never materialized. In an era where perception can shape investment flows and diplomatic leverage, Pakistan cannot afford to ignore the importance of optics.
The deeper risk lies in Islamabad’s persistent gap between opportunity and execution. Without disciplined follow-up, the pledges secured at Tianjin will remain headlines rather than results. There is also the danger of overdependence on China at a time when the U.S.–China rivalry is intensifying. A Pakistan that ties itself too tightly to one pole risks losing the strategic flexibility that multipolarity is supposed to offer. Equally problematic is the continued reliance on emotional narratives—“eternal enmity” or “all-weather friendship”—that cloud the pursuit of hard interests.
The SCO summit made one fact clear: the world’s major players know how to separate narrative from interest. India can spar with China on the Himalayan border and still sit across the table in Tianjin. Russia can support India in BRICS while simultaneously courting Pakistan for energy exports. China can reassure Pakistan of its support while warming ties with New Delhi. This is diplomacy as it is practiced by states that prioritize interests over emotions.
For Pakistan, the lesson is stark. National narratives may have value, but when they are detached from national interest they become hollow slogans. The discipline of diplomacy lies in protecting and advancing interests even when emotions, history, or domestic politics suggest otherwise. The SCO offers Islamabad financing, skills development, and security partnerships. But without preparation, delivery, and a shift in mindset, these opportunities will remain unrealized.
The Tianjin summit will be remembered as a moment when the SCO transitioned from being a ceremonial platform to a tools-based organization shaping Eurasia’s future. For Pakistan, the choice is simple but profound: to remain trapped in narratives or to embrace interests as the ultimate narrative. The stakes are high, because in a multipolar order, those who fail to act are not just left behind—they are forgotten.
