When you can’t fix the crack, you paint over the wall, and that’s exactly what India has been doing since the loss of Operation Sindoor. The operation was a strategic embarrassment, and instead of accepting it and learning from it, many in India, from government officials to media voices, have been trying to cover it up. They have done this through loud speeches, emotional headlines, and forceful opinion pieces. Sadanand Dhume’s recent fabrication in “The Wall Street Journal”, attempting to compare Pakistan and Iran’s nuclear programs, is yet another example of a flawed narrative shaped more by frustration than facts. Rather than addressing the failure, he shifts attention by creating fear and making weak comparisons between Pakistan and Iran’s nuclear programs – a comparison that doesn’t make sense. His article doesn’t come from careful thought. It stems from frustration and a desire to prove something after a national setback.
In his article, Dhume tries to scare readers by claiming that a nuclear-armed Iran would be more dangerous than Pakistan. To support his argument, he places Pakistan and Iran in the same category, overlooking how different their nuclear programs truly are. Pakistan didn’t pursue the nuclear path out of pride or power projection; it was compelled to do so by relentless Indian hostility. Since its creation, India has regarded Pakistan as an adversary: from illegally occupying Kashmir to waging a full-scale war in 1965, and then in 1971, played a direct role in dividing Pakistan into two and supporting the formation of Bangladesh. Just three years later, India conducted its first nuclear test in Pokhran in 1974, sending a loud and clear message of regional dominance. In an environment of constant provocation and existential threats, Pakistan developed its nuclear program not out of ambition but as a necessary deterrent against Indian aggression.
Iran, on the other hand, has been under intense international scrutiny for nearly fifty years. The country has consistently emphasized that its nuclear ambitions are peaceful, focused on energy production, medical research, and scientific development, and claims that its program operates completely within these bounds. Comparing Pakistan with Iran is misleading, as it overlooks the differing political systems, security concerns, and histories of these nations. This is not an analysis; rather, it is a skillfully crafted, dangerous viewpoint that reflects India’s sick mindset.
Dhume’s claim about how Pakistan acquired the nuclear bomb lacks serious analysis—it expresses frustration. His words reflect the pain India still feels after the embarrassment of Operation Sindoor. Rather than acknowledging Pakistan’s success, many Indians try to cover it up by spreading false and distorted narratives. Asserting that the Pakistan nuclear program was based on “theft” and “charity” is merely a product of their own imagination. In reality, our nuclear capabilities were the result of the tireless efforts of numerous Pakistani scientists, engineers, and leaders who sacrificed everything to protect their country. This was a national achievement, forged through unity, courage, and determination.
India’s real problem is not how Pakistan got the bomb; it’s the fact that we got it at all, despite all their efforts to stop us. That’s what truly bothered them. Now, writers like Dhume try to provoke Pakistan into revealing defense secrets. But what they don’t realize is: real strength doesn’t need to explain itself. And those who shout the loudest often understand the least. Pakistan doesn’t need to explain how it became a nuclear power. The fact that we did it against all odds is enough. And no amount of frustrated words can change the truth.
Another claim is that the US looked the other way while Pakistan pursued the bomb. Even if we accept the claim that the US knowingly overlooked Pakistan’s nuclear program, let’s not pretend it was out of trust or blind loyalty. It was America’s own strategic interests. Washington needed a frontline state against the Soviets in Afghanistan, so nonproliferation conveniently took a backseat. This wasn’t generosity – it was cold, hard realpolitik. The same US that struck civil nuclear deals with India later, despite its refusal to sign the NPT, has always bent the rules when it suited its agenda. So don’t twist history to paint Pakistan as a beneficiary of US leniency. Pakistan acted in its national interests, just as America did in its own.
Dhume’s assertion that allowing Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons was India’s biggest mistake overlooks an important fact: India went nuclear first, not Pakistan. After the wars from 1965 to 1971 and years of hostility, what should Pakistan have done? Wait for another attack? Building the bomb was about protecting our people, not threatening others. He quotes Mr. Panda saying India had to “tolerate death by a thousand cuts,” but who forced India to tolerate anything? No one. What India couldn’t do was launch a full-scale war because Pakistan had the bomb. Here, Dhume is attempting to portray Pakistan’s nuclear weapons as a tool of terrorism, when in reality, they serve as a tool of deterrence that has effectively prevented the region from falling into chaos.
Blaming Pakistan now while ignoring India’s actions in Kashmir, Gujarat 2002, and the rise of Hindutva extremism is pure hypocrisy. The West, too, has no moral high ground; it once trained the same militants it now condemns, and even backed Osama bin Laden. The truth is simple: Pakistan didn’t destabilize the region; it stopped India from acting with impunity. And that’s what Dhume can’t digest.
Additionally, he argues that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose a substantial threat to the world. However, he intentionally overlooks the fact that Iran remains a signatory to the NPT and allows for regular IAEA inspections, unlike Israel, which possesses nuclear weapons outside of any international framework and faces no accountability. Blaming Iran by supporting groups like Hezbollah or Hamas, without addressing the decades of occupation and injustice that fuel such resistance, presents a one-sided and incomplete perspective.
In conclusion, a closer analysis reveals that Dhume’s piece is filled with frustration toward Pakistan. What truly enrages him isn’t Iran or Pakistan’s nuclear capability. The truth is, India still hasn’t moved on from what happened during the so-called Operation Sindoor. What really bothers Dhume isn’t that Pakistan has nuclear weapons; it’s that Pakistan stood its ground, shocked them, and proved it could match India’s power on equal footing. He calls Pakistan’s nuclear program a “blunder” because the embarrassment of Operation Sindoor still hurts Indian pride. It was not a blunder; it was a seismic shock they will never recover from.
