Concluding Part Three
Asif Haroon Raja
Strategic Assessment and Future Outlook
Pakistan’s Strategic Concerns
Pakistan has consistently maintained that a peaceful, stable, and economically viable Afghanistan is indispensable for lasting regional security.
Since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, Islamabad has pursued a policy based on engagement rather than confrontation. It has extended humanitarian assistance, facilitated diplomatic dialogue, promoted regional connectivity, and repeatedly encouraged Kabul to fulfil its international obligations.
Despite these efforts, Pakistan remains deeply concerned over the continued presence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA), Daesh-Khorasan (ISKP), and several other terrorist organisations operating from Afghan territory.
Islamabad maintains that repeated cross-border attacks, infiltration of militants, illegal arms trafficking, and the use of Afghan soil by anti-Pakistan groups constitute the most serious challenge to peace along the western frontier.
Pakistan has repeatedly emphasised that it seeks cooperation rather than conflict with Afghanistan.
However, after exhausting diplomatic channels and confidence-building measures, it has adopted calibrated, intelligence-driven counterterrorism operations against imminent terrorist threats originating across the border, asserting its inherent right of self-defence under international law.
Pakistan continues to stress that these operations are directed exclusively against terrorist infrastructure and not against the Afghan State or its people.
A stable and responsible government in Kabul, capable of exercising effective control over its territory and preventing terrorism, remains Pakistan’s preferred strategic outcome.
China’s Strategic Concerns
China views developments in Afghanistan primarily through the prism of national security and regional stability. Beijing’s foremost concern is preventing extremist organisations, particularly the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), from exploiting Afghan territory to infiltrate Xinjiang.
Equally important are China’s substantial economic interests. Afghanistan occupies a strategically significant position linking Central Asia with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Continued instability threatens regional trade, infrastructure development, and long-term investment plans extending from Western China into South and Central Asia.
The security of the Wakhan Corridor carries particular significance because it represents Afghanistan’s only direct land connection with China.
Any deterioration of security in this region could adversely affect China’s western frontier and regional connectivity projects.
Consequently, Beijing favours the emergence of an Afghan government capable of maintaining internal stability, combating terrorism, and engaging constructively with neighbouring countries.
Implications for the Central Asian Republics
The evolving security situation in Northern Afghanistan directly affects Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. These States remain concerned that prolonged instability could facilitate the movement of extremist organisations, narcotics traffickers, organised criminal networks, and illegal weapons across their borders.
The possibility of renewed refugee flows, disruption of regional transport corridors, and threats to planned energy and trade projects has reinforced Central Asian interest in Afghanistan’s internal stability.
Should armed resistance continue expanding in Badakhshan and adjoining provinces, the northern frontier could once again become an arena of prolonged conflict, with consequences extending throughout Central Asia.
International Dimension
Although no major international power has officially declared military support for anti-Taliban resistance movements, regional and global stakeholders continue to monitor developments closely.
Many governments remain dissatisfied with the Taliban’s failure to establish an inclusive political system, fulfil commitments relating to counterterrorism, and improve respect for fundamental human rights, particularly those affecting women and girls.
Diplomatic engagement with Kabul therefore continues without formal international recognition, while humanitarian assistance remains essential to prevent further deterioration of Afghanistan’s economic and social conditions.
Should security conditions deteriorate significantly, external actors may increasingly reassess their political and strategic options concerning Afghanistan.
Strategic Assessment
Afghanistan appears to be entering another period of strategic uncertainty. Unlike the immediate aftermath of the Taliban’s return to power, today’s challenges are multidimensional and mutually reinforcing.
The regime confronts growing economic hardship, widespread unemployment, declining public confidence, humanitarian distress, diplomatic isolation, internal factional rivalries, and an expanding network of armed resistance movements led by experienced former Afghan National Army commanders.
The emergence of multiple resistance organisations—including the National Resistance Front (NRF), Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), Afghanistan United Front (AUF), and other regional groups—suggests that opposition to Taliban rule is becoming increasingly organised.
Whether these movements eventually unite under a common political and military command may prove decisive in determining their future effectiveness.
While the Taliban continue to retain significant military capability, centralized authority, and control over most provincial capitals, however the TTP threat, and internal power struggle among the Qandaharis, Khostis and the Kabulis could weaken the hold of the ruling regime.
However, it would be premature to conclude that the Taliban movement faces imminent collapse.
The more probable scenario is the emergence of a prolonged contest between an entrenched Taliban administration and gradually expanding resistance movements, with the outcome depending upon military cohesion, political legitimacy, economic resilience, and external diplomatic developments.
Future Outlook
Afghanistan’s future will largely depend upon whether its leadership chooses political accommodation or continued exclusivity and antagonism.
So far the ruling regime has adopted a posture of rigidity and inflexibility towards Pakistan, and is showing no signs of rapprochement. Its affections are heavily tilted towards India and Israel.
The establishment of a broadly representative and inclusive government, reflecting Afghanistan’s ethnic, political, and regional diversity, could contribute significantly to national reconciliation, improved governance, economic recovery, and regional stability.
Such a development would also reduce opportunities for terrorist organisations to exploit Afghanistan’s internal divisions while improving relations with neighbouring states.
Conversely, continued political exclusion, economic deterioration, and failure to curb terrorism could deepen internal instability and gradually transform scattered resistance activities into a broader nationwide insurgency.
The Northern Alliance has gained an upper edge in vital parts of Northern Afghanistan. Pakistan’s proactive and offensive policy against noncooperative Afghan Taliban has possibly emboldened the resistance forces to accelerate their offensives in Northern Afghanistan, and to strike targets in Qandahar, Kabul and Western Province.
Their ultimate success will depend upon the unity of the groups, increased recruitment of trained fighters from former ANA, external support in the form of funds and arms, and above all, support from the oppressed people of Eastern, Western and Southern Afghanistan, resentful of the anti-people policies of the rulers.
India and Israel are not only providing heavy funds to the IEA, they are also funding and equipping the anti-Pakistan terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Closure of Chahbahar Port and blockade of Wakhan corridor has made replenishments difficult.
Since instability in Afghanistan suits both India and Israel, both are instrumental in influencing the Afghan Taliban regime to reject Pakistan’s gestures of peace and friendship, and to continue abetting cross border terrorism.
For Pakistan, lasting peace remains inseparable from a stable Afghanistan that neither exports terrorism nor serves as a theatre for proxy conflicts involving hostile external actors.
For China and the Central Asian Republics, Afghanistan’s stability remains essential for regional connectivity, economic integration, and collective security.
The coming months are therefore likely to prove decisive. They will determine whether Afghanistan moves towards political reconciliation and regional cooperation or enters another prolonged cycle of conflict with far-reaching consequences for the entire region.
Conclusion
Afghanistan stands at a strategic crossroads. The behaviour of the Taliban regime, the evolution of organised resistance, the effectiveness of regional diplomacy, and the willingness of all Afghan stakeholders to pursue an inclusive political settlement will collectively shape the country’s future.
While it is too early to predict a decisive shift in the balance of power, recent developments clearly indicate that Afghanistan’s security environment is undergoing significant transformation.
The trajectory of these events will influence not only Afghanistan’s internal stability but also the security architecture of Pakistan, China, Central Asia, and the wider region for years to come.
                                            — Concluded
About the Author
Brigadier (Retd) Asif Haroon Raja, SI (M) is a war veteran. He is Command and Staff Course and War Course qualified, holds an MSc in War Studies, and served as Defence Attaché in Egypt and Sudan, as well as Dean of the Corps of Military Attachés in Cairo.
He is a defence, security, and geopolitical analyst, columnist, featured columnist of IntelDrop magazine Washington, author of five books, former Chairman of Thinkers Forum Pakistan, Patron-in-Chief of Centre for Development Studies Think Tank, Director of Meesakh Research Centre; he regularly appears on media platforms.
