Something seems to have become seriously entangled in the prevailing geopolitical order.
The United States (US) is Israel’s principal patron and protector. Washington knows that its support for Israel comes at a very high political, economic and strategic cost and could eventually prove burdensome even for the US itself.
Yet, despite these costs, it continues to stand firmly behind Israel and remains unwilling to abandon its principal ally in the Middle East.
Israel, in turn, enjoys an exceptionally close strategic relationship with India. The two countries have developed extensive political, military, intelligence and technological cooperation, while their strategic perceptions and certain external objectives increasingly converge.
Then come India and Afghanistan. India has traditionally regarded Afghanistan as an important strategic partner and has cultivated deep political, economic and diplomatic links with the country.
Yet, despite the severe difficulties Afghanistan is currently facing, India appears reluctant or unable to provide the kind of support that Kabul might expect from such a close partner.
The situation becomes even more paradoxical when India’s relationship with Iran is considered. India maintains close relations with both Iran and Israel.
Israel, however, has repeatedly attacked Iranian interests, while India has continued its strategic relationship with Israel and, at times, taken positions that have disappointed Tehran.
Yet Iran has continued to maintain its friendship and strategic engagement with India despite being stabbed twice in the back in the two wars with the US.
In other words, Iran finds itself maintaining close relations with the strategic partner of its adversary while simultaneously bearing the consequences of actions by that adversary.
Such are the contradictions of contemporary geopolitics.
The US-Pakistan relationship presents another paradox. Washington has recently acknowledged Pakistan’s constructive role and has spoken positively about bilateral cooperation, while its rhetoric towards India has at times been critical.
Yet the US continues to deepen its strategic and defence relationship with India, including through long-term defence arrangements.
This demonstrates that, in international politics, public rhetoric and strategic interests do not always move in the same direction.
The same contradiction can be observed in the Gulf and Red Sea theatre. The US considers Saudi Arabia a strategic partner and has strong relations with the Kingdom.
At the same time, Washington has not necessarily responded to every Saudi request for direct military action against the Houthis in Yemen.
Its approach has differed depending upon the circumstances and the wider American-Israeli strategic calculations.
The growing friction between Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Houthis is therefore creating a difficult situation for Pakistan.
Pakistan has close fraternal, strategic and defence relations with Saudi Arabia, while it also seeks to maintain constructive relations with Iran and avoid becoming a party to regional conflicts.
Any escalation could therefore place Islamabad in a delicate strategic dilemma.
Meanwhile, different actors may perceive such developments through very different lenses.
*Iran may see opportunities as well as risks.
*India and Israel may regard regional instability as an opportunity to complicate Pakistan’s strategic environment.
*And some Indian voices are already urging Pakistan to become directly involved in the conflict.
This raises a broader question:
Is the international system increasingly being governed by principles—or by the pursuit of narrowly defined national interests?
The answer appears increasingly clear. In today’s world, very few countries have permanent friends or permanent enemies.
National interest, strategic advantage and geopolitical calculations largely determine the alignment of states.
Alliances are often transactional, partnerships are frequently conditional, and yesterday’s adversary can become today’s partner when interests converge.
Against this background, Pakistan’s approach appears comparatively different.
Rather than seeking confrontation with one camp or becoming part of a bloc, Pakistan has generally tried to maintain relations with all major regional and global players.
It seeks to mediate, de-escalate tensions and promote dialogue wherever possible.
Its stated preference is for peace and stability rather than perpetual conflict.
The Makkah Defence Accord should therefore be viewed in this context. Its fundamental purpose is defensive:
“To enhance collective security, strengthen deterrence and ensure that the participating countries are capable of responding collectively to threats against their security.”
It is not designed as an offensive alliance against any particular country.
Nevertheless, the emergence of such a collective defence arrangement is likely to cause concern in Israel and India, particularly because it could enhance strategic coordination among important Muslim States and strengthen their collective deterrence.
At the same time, developments elsewhere could complicate the situation.
The growing friction between Türkiye and Israel in Syria, particularly over competing strategic interests and the Kurdish question, as well as the escalating Saudi-Houthi confrontation, could create additional pressures on the Makkah Defence Accord and test the cohesion of its members.
Pakistan consequently faces a difficult balancing act. It has to honour its strategic and defence commitments, protect its national interests, maintain its relations with Iran and the Arab world, and at the same time avoid being dragged into conflicts that do not directly concern its national security.
The larger lesson is that international politics is rarely about permanent friendships; it is about permanent interests.
Every major power is playing its own game.
Pakistan’s challenge is not necessarily to stop others from playing their games.
Its challenge is to understand the games being played around it, avoid becoming a pawn in someone else’s strategy, safeguard its national interests, and use its diplomatic and strategic leverage to promote peace and stability.
In an increasingly turbulent world, strategic wisdom lies not in choosing sides blindly but in knowing when to stand firm, when to mediate, and when to stay out of someone else’s war.
Brigadier (Retd) Asif Haroon Raja, SI (M), is a war veteran. He is Command and Staff Course and War Course qualified, holds an MSc in War Studies, and served as Defence Attaché in Egypt and Sudan, as well as Dean of the Corps of Military Attachés in Cairo. He commanded the largest brigade in Kashmir. He is a defence, security, and geopolitical analyst, columnist, featured columnist for IntelDrop magazine in Washington, author of five books, former Chairman of the Thinkers Forum Pakistan, Patron-in-Chief of the Centre for Development Studies Think Tank, and Director of Meesakh Research Centre; he regularly appears on media platforms.
