Part Two
Asif Haroon Raja
Following Partition in 1947, India and Pakistan emerged as the two principal successor states to British India.
India, however, has traditionally viewed itself as the principal successor to the British Indian State, a perception that has influenced its strategic outlook and regional ambitions.
Sections of India’s Brahmanical political establishment have continued to promote the concept of Akhand Bharat (Undivided India)—an ideological vision of a culturally and historically unified subcontinent.
Although proponents portray it primarily as a civilisational concept, its implications have generated apprehension among neighbouring countries regarding India’s long-term regional ambitions.
India’s Regional Ambitions and Internal Contradictions
Since independence, both the Congress Party and the Hindu Mahasabha, and subsequently the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have advanced different visions of Indian nationalism and national identity.
While the Congress tradition generally sought to accommodate India’s religious and cultural diversity within a secular political framework, it also periodically accommodated elements of Hindu nationalism.
The BJP, meanwhile, has pursued a more explicit Hindutva-oriented political agenda and is widely regarded as having close ideological and organisational links with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).
Founded in 1925, the RSS has long advocated the concept of Hindu Rashtra (Hindu nation), an ideology that has exerted considerable influence on contemporary Hindu nationalist politics.
Mahatma Gandhi, who consistently advocated non-violence, communal harmony and religious coexistence, was assassinated in 1948 by Nathuram Godse, a Hindu nationalist extremist who had been associated with Hindu nationalist organisations, including the RSS. The RSS has denied institutional responsibility for the assassination.
The ideological evolution of Indian politics has consequently intensified concerns among sections of India’s minority communities regarding the future character of the country’s secular constitutional framework.
India’s conduct in South Asia has likewise raised concerns among some of its neighbours about what they perceive as an increasingly assertive regional posture.
Farce of Secularism
While New Delhi projects itself internationally as the world’s largest democracy and as a champion of secularism, human rights and the rule of law, its critics argue that aspects of its domestic and regional policies do not always correspond with this image.
Concerns regarding discrimination against religious minorities—including Muslims, Christians and Sikhs—as well as the continuing social and economic marginalisation of sections of India’s Dalit population, have fuelled debate over the gap between India’s democratic credentials and realities on the ground.
Social Inequalities in the Indian Union
The Republic of India comprises 28 States and eight Union Territories and encompasses extraordinary ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious diversity. It is, in many respects, a remarkable mosaic of civilisations, languages, cultures and communities.
Yet the social inequalities rooted in India’s traditional caste hierarchy continue to influence aspects of society despite constitutional guarantees of equality and affirmative-action measures.
Discriminatory Caste System
India has undertaken significant legal and institutional measures to combat caste discrimination; nevertheless, the persistence of social divisions remains an important subject of domestic and international debate.
The traditional four-fold caste hierarchy, historically shaped by Brahmanical social thought, remains deeply embedded in Indian society, despite constitutional guarantees of equality and decades of affirmative-action policies.
Internal Security Challenges
India has also faced numerous internal security challenges since independence. Insurgencies and separatist movements have emerged in several regions, including Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, parts of Central India affected by Maoist insurgency, Punjab during the Khalistan insurgency, and Jammu and Kashmir.
While some of these movements have declined, entered peace processes or been militarily contained, others continue to generate security and political challenges.
The Naxalite insurgency has long constituted one of the most serious internal-security challenges confronting the Indian State, exposing deep socio-economic and political grievances in parts of Central and Eastern India.
Their persistence reflects a complex combination of historical grievances, ethnic aspirations, political alienation and socio-economic disparities.
The Northeastern States, particularly Manipur, have witnessed recurring ethnic violence and instability in recent years.
Demands associated with Khalistan have also re-emerged among segments of the Sikh diaspora, while Jammu and Kashmir remain a persistent source of tension between India and Pakistan despite extensive security deployments and prolonged counter-insurgency measures.
India’s Regional Interventions
Rather than concentrating exclusively on its own internal political and security challenges, India has frequently sought to influence political developments in neighbouring countries.
Pakistan has consistently accused India of interference in its internal affairs, while Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives have, at different times, experienced diplomatic friction with New Delhi over issues involving sovereignty, political influence, economic pressure or perceived regional dominance.
The deterioration of India-Bangladesh relations following the ouster of Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League government, alongside improving ties between Pakistan and Bangladesh, has altered the regional diplomatic landscape.
These developments could provide an opportunity for South Asian states to pursue a more balanced regional order based on mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference and peaceful coexistence rather than strategic rivalry and hegemonic competition.
The Four-Day India–Pakistan War
The four-day India–Pakistan conflict of May 2025 marked a significant turning point in the strategic relationship between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.
Following what Pakistan regards as its successful military performance during the conflict, New Delhi has increasingly sought to contain Pakistan’s growing diplomatic and strategic influence and to limit the international profile of its military leadership.
The emergence of Pakistan’s Chief of Defence Forces, Syed Asim Munir, as an increasingly prominent figure in regional diplomacy has further attracted international attention.
His reported role in facilitating diplomatic efforts between the United States and Iran has added another dimension to Pakistan’s emerging diplomatic profile, irrespective of how the broader agreement ultimately unfolds.
Rather than focusing solely on its own internal challenges, New Delhi appears increasingly determined to employ diplomatic, media and information resources to counter Islamabad’s growing influence and shape international perceptions in its favour.
India has demonstrated considerable effectiveness in propaganda, narrative construction and the battle for perceptions. In modern conflict, winning the battle of perception can be almost as important as winning the battle on the ground.
India, however, may find it difficult to launch a “Sindoor-2” against Pakistan merely to settle scores, particularly in view of Pakistan’s heightened military preparedness and the lessons learned from the May 2025 conflict.
The present state of India’s relations with Washington may constitute another constraint on any attempt to pursue a more aggressive strategy against Pakistan.
India has also been unable to create a decisive breach in the Pakistan–China strategic partnership. Pakistan’s relationship with China remains one of the defining pillars of the regional balance of power.
The China–Pakistan relationship extends far beyond economic cooperation under the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It encompasses defence cooperation, diplomatic coordination, strategic communication, intelligence cooperation and a shared interest in maintaining regional stability.
As Pakistan’s strategic and diplomatic importance continues to grow, India’s long-standing policy of seeking regional primacy faces a more complex strategic environment than it did in the early decades after independence.
To be concluded
About the Author
Brigadier (Retd) Asif Haroon Raja, SI (M) is a war veteran. He is Command and Staff Course and War Course qualified, holds an MSc in War Studies, and served as Defence Attaché in Egypt and Sudan, as well as Dean of the Corps of Military Attachés in Cairo.
He is a defence, security, and geopolitical analyst, columnist, featured columnist of IntelDrop magazine Washington, author of five books, former Chairman of Thinkers Forum Pakistan, Patron-in-Chief of Centre for Development Studies Think Tank, Director of Meesakh Research Centre; he regularly appears on media platforms.
